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Real Property-THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-OPTION CONTRACT HELD
VOID DUE TO VIOLATION OF THE COMMON LAW RULE-United Virginia Bank
v. Union Oil, 214 Va. 48, 197 S.E.2d 174 (1973).
The Rule against Perpetuities as originally developed in England and
crystalized over two centuries' is still alive and thriving in the Common-
wealth of Virginia as evidenced by the recent supreme court case of United
Virginia Bank v. Union Oil.2 While a number of states have enacted legisla-
tion or judicially adopted3 ways and means to avoid the harsh results often
dictated by the common law rule,4 it appears that Virginia may be defend-
ing a rearguard position which may not be functional in terms of today's
commercial world.
In United Virginia Bank v. Union Oil, W.J. Abbitt, now deceased and
represented by United Virginia Bank, entered into an agreement granting
Union Oil a 120 day option to purchase a parcel of land located at the
intersection of two highways which were proposed for future construction
in the City of Newport News, Virginia. Union Oil subsequently assigned
its rights under the contract to Sanford & Charles, Inc., the active appellee
in this suit. Under the terms of the agreement,5 the 120 day option became
exercisable by the optionee only after the rights-of-way to both highways
1. While Lord Nottingham is credited with the original statement of the Rule against
Perpetuities in the Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682), it was not
until a full 150 years later that the period of perpetuities was firmly established in Cadell v.
Palmer, 1 Cl. & Fin. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833). The rule as stated by Gray in his comprehen-
sive treatment of the subject is as follows:
NO INTEREST IS GOOD UNLESS IT MUST VEST, IF AT ALL, NOT LATER
THAN TWENTY-ONE YEARS AFTER SOME LIFE IN BEING AT THE CREA-
TION OF THE INTEREST. J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPEruIEs § 201 (4th ed.
R. Gray 1942).
The often criticized decision in Longon & Southwestern Ry. v. Gomm, [1882] 20 Ch. D.
562, marked the initital application of the Rule against Perpetuities to option contracts for
the sale and purchase of real estate. This decision, however, dealt with a perpetual option
agreement declaring it in violation of the Rule.
2. 214 Va. 48, 197 S.E.2d 174 (1973).
3. For a general outline of the trends in this area see Committee on Rules Against Perpetui-
ties, Further Trends in Perpetuities, 5 REAL PRop. PROB. & TR. J. 333 (1970); Lynn,
Perpetuities Reform: An Analysis of Developments in England and the United States, 113
U. PA. L. Rav. 508 (1965); Schuyler, The New Biology and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 15
U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 420 (1968); 13 AM. U. L. REv. 67 (1963); 28 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 184 (1971).
4. Leach, Perpetuities In a Nutshell, 51 HsAv. L. Rv. 638 (1938); Leach, Perpetuities:
What Legislatures, Courts, and Practitioners Can Do About the Follies of the Rule, 13 KAN.
L. REv. 351 (1965).
5. 214 Va. at 49, 197 S.E.2d at 175. The agreement provided as follows:
It is expressly understood that the 120 days option period shall begin at the time the
City of Newport News, Virginia acquires the right of way of Boxley Boulevard Exten-
sion and new U.S. 60.
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were turned over to the City of Newport News for administration and
maintenance. The Supreme Court of Virginia, in a decision by Justice
Carrico, held the option in gross6 (not appurtenant to a leasehold interest)
provided for in the agreement invalid,7 and in so doing, followed a strict
common law approach to the problem.' The court pointed out that the
Rule against Perpetuities would apply to a contingent equitable future
interest created by an option contract for the sale of real estate.' It then
went on to hold the option agreement void ab initio1o because the option
was exercisable only after the contingencies provided for in the agreement
6. Society's interests demand that land and other property not be tied up for immeasurable
periods of time, but rather that they remain as freely alienable as possible so as to foster
economic growth. An option in gross, which is a right to purchase property not incident to a
lease may, however, have disastrous effects upon the alienability and improvement of the
land involved. As long as the option remains exercisable the owner of the property cannot
afford to make improvements which may subsequently be taken without additional compen-
sation by an exercise of the option. See Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 A. 312 (1914); Leach,
Perpetuities In a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. Rav. 638 (1938).
An option appendant, which is an option to purchase given to a lessee of property, creates
a situation entirely opposite from the one described above as improvement of the land is not
hindered. The lessee can build as he pleases and make other improvements which he may
deem necessary to the property. He is assured that he will not lose the value of the work he
has put into the land by virtue of his option to purchase incident to the lease. See W.B. LEACH
& 0. TUDOR, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 24.57 (1957); Abbot, Leases and the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 27 YALE L. J. 878 (1918); cf. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 395 (1944),
wherein the enforceability of options appendant are upheld subject to the added stipulation
that they must not under any circumstances be exercisable after the lease terminates. Contra,
J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETurrIEs § 230.3 (4th ed. R. Gray 1942), which holds, in
accordance with the English approach, that an option appendant which exceeds, or may
possibly exceed, the limits of the perpetuities period is void. See generally 13 FLA. L. REv.
214 (1960), for a discussion of the different effects a fixed price option as opposed to a market
price option may have upon the problem under discussion.
Note that while options in gross are generally held to be invalid if they "may" exceed the
period of perpetuities, the option appendant capable of doing likewise is always held valid.
One of the few cases ever to attack the validity of an option appendant was First Huntington
Nat'l Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 139 W. Va. 130, 79 S.E.2d 675 (1953). This situation,
however, was soon rectified by statute in W. VA. CODE § 36-1-24 (1957).
7. This decision of the Virginia Supreme Court reversed the Corporation Court of Newport
News, which found in favor of Sanford & Charles, Inc., when it originally decided that the
agreement did not violate the Rule against Perpetuities.
8. See note 14 infra, for an outline of the common law approach to solving an option
perpetuities problem.
9. See Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 137 Va. 397, 119 S.E. 89 (1923); Starcher Bros. v.
Duty, 61 W. Va. 373, 56 S.E. 524 (1907). These cases are based directly upon London &
Southwestern Ry. v. Gomm, [1882] 20 Ch. D. 562. See also 1 R. MINOR, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 823 (2d ed. F. Ribble 1928).
10. Accord, Burruss v. Baldwin, 199 Va. 883, 887, 103 S.E.2d 249, 252 (1958), citing Clai-
borne v. Wilson, 168 Va. 469, 192 S.E. 585 (1937), and Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 137
Va. 397, 119 S.E. 89 (1923).
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were met," and there existed the "distinct possibility' '1 2 that these condi-
tions precedent would in fact not be fulfilled within the twenty-one year
period set by the Rule.'3
The application of the Rule against Perpetuities to option contracts and
commercial transactions'" has been subjected to wide attack." It is argued
that the period fixed by the Rule, that of a "life or lives in being plus
twenty-one years and ten months,"" has little or no significance and mean-
ing in the modern business world. While the period may have proven useful
to control family gifts and to limit the effect the "dead hand" might
exercise over property, it has been argued that today, in modem commer-
cial transactions, it is devoid of any rationale. 17 Proponents of reform also
argue that an option agreement, in and of itself, before it is exercised,
creates no interest in the property at all, but is merely a contract right and
therefore should not be subject to the Rule in the first place, regardless of
its potential duration."
Various arguments made by the appellees based on recent decisions and
legislation involving the Rule against Perpetuities all proved unconvinc-
11. See note 5 supra.
12. 214 Va. at 52, 197 S.E.2d at 177.
13. While the Rule demands that the interest vest, if at all, within the period of a life or
lives in being plus twenty-one years and ten months, if the parties have not contracted with
reference to lives in being then the gross period of twenty-one years becomes determinative
in passing on the validity of the interest. See Murphy v. Johnston, 190 Ga. 23, 8 S.E.2d 23
(1940); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 A. 312 (1914).
14. The first application of the Rule against Perpetuities to option contracts for the sale
or purchase of land came in the much criticized English decision of London & Southwestern
Ry. v. Gomm, [1882] 20 Ch. D. 562. The holding stated that the optionee possessed a
contingent equitable future interest in the property by virtue of the fact that his rights were
specifically enforceable in a court of equity. Furthermore, because there existed the possibil-
ity that the option might not be .exercised within the period fixed by the Rule, it was held
that such an interest would be void ab initio. This case overruled Birmingham Canal Co. v.
Cartwright, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 421, which previously had decided that an option contract
created no interest in the property before it was exercised. See Berg, Long-Term Options and
the Rule Against Perpetuities, 37 CAuIF. L. REv. 235 (1949).
15. See W.B. LEACH & 0. TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PERPgrurriEs § 24.56 (1957); Berg,
Long Term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 235 (1949); accord,
Leach, Perpetuities in Real Estate: Legislative Reform, 6 PR c. LAw., Dec. 1960, at 36.
16. See note 1 supra, for the derivation of this period of perpetuities.
17. See W.B. LEACH & 0. TUDOR, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPErum Es § 24.56 (1957); Leach,
Perpetuities In a Nutshell, 51 HAiv. L. REv. 638 (1938).
18. See Berg, Long Term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 37 CAIn. L. REv. 235
(1949), for a well-written and thorough discussion of why the Rule should never have been
applied to option contracts, using the contract theories of Williston and Corbin. Contra,
Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 137 Va. 397, 119 S.E. 89 (1923); Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W.
Va. 193, 85 S.E. 170 (1915); RESTATEMENT OF PROPmRTY §§ 393-94 (1944); J. GRAY, THE RULE
AGAINST PEErs'MuIES § 330 (4th ed. R. Gray 1942).
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ing to the supreme court.'9 A plea that the court exercise its cy pres power
of judiciary and imply a "reasonable time" provision into the contract, as
was done in Isen v. Giant Food, Inc. ,10 was refused. The court held that
Isen was "factually and legally different from the case at bar"2' apparently
because it involved an agreement to lease land after proper zoning had
been obtained. In upholding the agreement, the District of Columbia court
pointed to certain phrases which were included in the contract, 2 and from
these was able to construe an intention of the parties that the contract be
completed within a "reasonable" time, which would certainly be shorter
than twenty-one years as provided by the Rule. 3 The Virginia court, how-
ever, noted that the agreement and the circumstances presented in the
case at bar were absolutely devoid of any such "dominant intent" from
which such a reasonable time provision could be implied." In fact, an
objective analysis of the case indicates a good probability that the pro-
posed highways would not be completed as scheduled,n and that the option
would therefore exceed the limits of the stipulated perpetuities period. The
court, in refusing to apply cy pres, also relied upon a prior Virginia case
which established a policy against the judicial utilization of this doctrine
to avoid the effects of the Rule against Perpetuities.2'
The appellee then urged the court to adopt the "wait and see" approach
which has been both judicially and legislatively accepted into the law of a
19. See articles cited in note 3 supra for a survey of the trends in the perpetuities area.
20. 295 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1961), noted in 37 NOrrRE DAME LAw. 561 (1962) and 19 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 91 (1962).
21. 214 Va. at 53, 197 S.E.2d at 177.
22. Language in the contract provided for Isen as landlord to "diligently pursue" the
petition for commercial zoning, and for Giant Food, Inc., as tenant, to "cooperate to the end
that such zoning be obtained as soon as possible." Isen v. Giant Food, Inc., 295 F.2d 136,
137 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
23. Id. at 138.
24. 214 Va. at 52, 197 S.E.2d at 177.
25. Facts revealed that while the city council of Newport News had requested the state
highway department to begin construction of "new U.S. 60" in August of 1966 (a few months
after the agreement in question was signed), official approval of the major thoroughfare plan
did not come until July, 1968. "New U.S. 60," a joint city-state-federal project, was under
construction at the time of the trial in 1971 and was scheduled for completion around the
beginning of 1973. The status, however, of the "Boxley Boulevard Extension," to be con-
structed as a private project by the owners of the property through which it would pass, was
entirely another matter. This highway, according to W.H. Gordon, Jr., the city's chief engi-
neer of traffic and transportation, would be completed "hopefully" by 1985 or, at the latest,
by January, 1987. Mr. Gordon also pointed out that the fixing of a target date for completion
did not indicate absolutely that it would be met, because of ever-changing conditions and
revisions of the plans which might be required. 214 Va. at 50, 197 S.E.2d at 176.
26. 214 Va. at 52, 197 S.E.2d at 177, citing Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 192
Va. 135,149, 63 S.E.2d 786,795 (1951).
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number of states.? This doctrine is in effect an "actualities test", wherein
only those events which take place after the agreement is completed are
considered when deciding whether or not a limitation is valid or void under
the Rule." Only when the period fixed by the Rule is violated "in fact" is
the option declared void.29 The court, in rejecting appellee's request, noted
that the established law in Virginia on this issue,3 0 to which it would
adhere, 3' was that a perpetuities problem is solved not on the basis of those
events which occur subsequent to the contract, but solely upon the facts
as they existed at the time the agreement was entered into." Therefore, in
the case at bar, the court could refuse to take into account any evidence
of the present state of construction of the two roads.3 It would consider
only their status at the inception of the agreement when the perpetuities
period actually began to run .3 The end result, holding the option contract
to be void ab initio, is therefore dictated by the existence of the possibility
that the option might not be exercisable within the allowable perpetuities
period because of the contingency attached thereto.?
It is submitted that the court's decision in United Virginia Bank v.
Union Oil was correct insofar as it effectively struck down what was a
potentially dangerous obstacle to the alienability and improvement of the
27. Leach, Perpetuities: What Legislatures, Courts, and Practitioners Can Do About the
Follies of the Rule, 13 KAN. L. REV. 351 (1965); Lynn, Perpetuities Reform: An Analysis of
Developments in England and the United States, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 508 (1965); Lynn, Raising
the Perpetutities Question: Conception, Adoption, "Wait and See," and Cy Pres, 17 VANi.
L. REv. 1391 (1964); Schuyler, The New Biology and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 15
U.C.L.A. L. Rsv. 420 (1968); 13 Am. U. L. REv. 67 (1963); 4 VuL. L. REv. 144 (1958).
28. See 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 184,191 (1971).
29. Id.
30. In Claiborne v. Wilson, the court noted:
Nor is it material in such cases how the fact actually turns out. The possibility that
the event may, in point of time, exceed the limits allowed, vitiates the limitation ab
initio. 168 Va. 469,474, 192 S.E. 585,586 (1937), quoting 1 R. MmnoR, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 820 (2d ed. F. Ribble 1928).
31. 214 Va. at 53, 197 S.E.2d at 178.
32. The common law would treat an option to purchase, which is exercisable after a stated
event takes place, without regard to whether or not the contingency has in fact been fulfilled.
So an agreement givingX an option to buy "when man reaches the moon" would be declared
void ab initio if it was made before man had in fact reached the moon. Even if man did reach
the moon one day after the agreement was made this would have no effect on the declaration
of the interest as being void, because the Rule takes into account only those facts in existence
at the time the agreement is entered into. The vesting of the contingency after the agreement
has no effect whatsoever on its validity. See W.B LEACH & 0. TUDOR, THE RuLE AGAznsT
PEsrourms § 24.24 (1957).
33. See note 25 supra.
34. 214 Va. at 53, 197 S.E.2d at 178.
35. See note 5 supra.
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property involved.-" However, the court's strict adherence to common law
principles when dealing with modem commercial transactions is somewhat
disturbing when one takes into consideration the fact that a valid option
in gross,37 capable of lasting over a century, could easily be created by
anyone reasonably well versed in perpetuities law." Realizing that such an
option would be repugnant in modem society,39 the need develops to for-
mulate a uniform rule that would be more meaningful in light of our
present day business situation. The decision in United Virginia Bank, and
the precedent setting cases on which it is based," indicates a need for
corrective legislation which will insure the salability and development of
our land resources by establishing new modem standards that will also
prove sensible and just in our dynamic commercial setting.
S. R. K.
36. The parcel of land subject to the option contract is for all practical purposes tied up
and removed from the market until the contingencies are met and the 120 day option period
runs out. The contingencies, however, may not be fulfilled for twenty-one or more years.
While subject to the option, the land cannot be sold because no one would be willing to buy
it subject to the option agreement, and the vendor would be leaving himself open for a breach
of contract suit if he were to sell to anyone other than the optionee. There can be no improve-
ment of the property for fear that anything added will subsequently be taken if the option is
exercised at the already predetermined price.
37. See note 6 supra for an explanation of the option in gross.
38. To formulate such a valid option the parties could contract with reference to an admin-
istratively acceptable number of healthy infants, one of whom would probably live to reach
age eighty. This period of lives in being (80 years) would then be added to the additional
twenty-one years provided by the rule thus creating a probable 100 year option, clearly within
the perpetuities period.
39. See note 14 supra.
40. Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 63 S.E.2d 786 (1951); Claiborne
v. Wilson, 168 Va. 469, 192 S.E.2d 585 (1937).
